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BEFORE GUARDIANSHIP: ABUSE OF PATIENT RIGHTS
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
Peter J. Strauss*
I expect my remarks to be somewhat controversial, so I will begin with
an explanation of my point of view and fundamental approach. I am a
practicing attorney. I have specialized in the problems of aging for about
twelve years and have concentrated on advising healthy clients about the
need to plan for the possibility of illness or incapacity by establishing a
system for financial management, such as durable powers of attorney and
living trusts, and advance directives for health care decision-making, such
as living wills and health care proxies. I also counsel families when crisis
intervention is necessary because of the severe illness of a family member.
I have been involved in many guardianship proceedings, representing both
petitioners and protectees, and as court-appointed guardian ad litem.
My experience in advising several thousand families in crisis has led me
to believe that the impaired client's needs are best served through some
form of adversarial process. For example, I was retained by the daughter
of an eighty-three year old widower (Mr. G) who was clearly suffering
from an illness that caused significant dementia. He lived alone, refused
all supportive care, was threatened with eviction because he would not
pay legitimate rent increases, and maintained his small apartment in such
a high degree 6f filth that the board of health cited him for code violations.
On behalf of the daughter, I brought a guardianship proceeding with the
hope that a court-appointed guardian would intervene to provide appro-
priate care for Mr. G and to protect his interests. The court-appointed
guardian ad litem, a person designated by statute the task of protecting
Mr. G's interests, agreed that a guardian should be appointed. I arrived
at the trial expecting a brief and uneventful hearing. Mr. G, however, had
retained his own attorney who vigorously contested the petition, making
me wish I had brought one of my litigation partners to the trial. Mean-
while, Mr. G roamed the courtroom shouting and screaming at the spec-
tators and the court officers.
The judge called counsel into chambers and stated that while it was
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quite clear that Mr. G was impaired, he did not think I had established
Mr. G's incapacity by sufficient evidence and inquired whether Mr. G's
lawyer had any suggestions for a settlement. He did. The lawyer found a
person who Mr. G knew from his church, who was trusted by Mr. G,
and to whom Mr. G was willing to give funds to be used to pay his back
rent, clean up the apartment, and hire part-time home care aides. Mr. G
agreed to this settlement because he felt he had won; he had resisted the
unwanted intervention of his daughter and the courts. Mr. G accepted this
limited intervention only because at some level he perceived the risk of a
greater loss of autonomy. The solution fashioned for Mr. G met his needs
in part and worked. He was thereafter agreeable to increased supportive
services, without further loss of control, as his needs increased. I strongly
believe this 'outcome could have occurred only through an adversarial
process.
One of the flaws in the guardianship systems in this country is that in
most cases the lawyer appointed by the court to represent the interests of
the protectee is really an advisor to the court, charged with informing the
court as to what appears to be in the best interest of the protectee, rather
than with advocating the expressed wishes of the protectee. Many advo-
cates for reform of guardianship laws (including, for example, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly
(CLPE)) have called for the protectee to be represented by an advocate
who will vigorously speak for the protectee's views. The CLPE organized
a National Guardianship Symposium in 1988 that recommended thirty-
three reform measures, including a proposal that protectees should be rep-
resented by counsel throughout the guardianship process.
Concerning this* issue, Nancy Coleman, Executive Director of the
CLPE, and Jeanne Dooley have written as follows:
Those opposed to "slow and contentious court proceedings" point to
the proposed ward's medical or social best interests, which they al-
lege would be advanced by prompt diagnosis and treatment. On the
other side, a finding of incapacity and subsequent appointment of a
guardian involve extremely important personal and property rights.
On balance, the conferees, like most legislatures and courts, con-
cluded that the medical considerations are outweighed by the even
more serious legal concerns. Thus, an adversarial hearing best re-
flects the proper balance between the need for care and treatment
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and the loss of rights.'
Nevertheless, guardianship law reform has been slow to adopt the advo-
cacy approach. While the recently enacted Florida guardianship statute
establishes a relatively vigorous adversary structure, the proposed New
York guardianship statute takes a middle ground approach, calling for an
attorney/advocate only where the protectee requests one or when the
court-appointed investigator believes it to be necessary to protect the rights
of the protectee.
It is extremely difficult to budge the managers of our legal system from
their fear that increased cost, administrative delay, and stress on the court
system would result if all guardianship proceedings were made adversarial
in nature. Why require this in all cases, they argue, when there are few
situations that require the adversarial approach? Imperfect as the guard-
ianship system may be in this regard, at least there is a mechanism for
questioning decisions regarding an impaired older adult and the opposi-
tion of the protectee can be aired and considered. This is not the case
when, say, nursing home placement decisions are made in the absence of a
guardianship proceeding or when an impaired senior citizen is being dis-
charged from a hospital. Consider the following exarriples:
Charles lives with his second wife, Betty, in a one bedroom apart-
ment. He is a middle level Alzheimer's victim and a home health
aide attends him daily for twelve hours. Betty can no longer cope
with Charles' behavior and the cramped quarters. She has difficulty
sleeping and is becoming increasingly angry about her plight. The
couple's assets are modest. Charles can be maintained in their resi-
dence with home care, but, understandably, Betty has decided to
have Charles admitted to a nursing home against his wishes. Other
family members support this decision. Who speaks for Charles?
Mary and Robert were married for forty years when Mary suffered
a severe stroke. Following months of hospitalization and rehabilita-
tion the hospital discharge planners and Robert decided it was in
Mary's best interests to be placed in a nursing home even though
Mary expressed a desire to return home and her physician felt she
could be maintained safely at home with home care. Who speaks for
1 Nancy Coleman & Jeanne Dooley, Making the Guardianship System Work, GENERATIONS,
Supp. 1990, at 47, 48.
19921
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Mary?
I do not want to be misunderstood. The decisions to place Charles and
Mary in nursing homes may have been the right decisions.
Most elderly people express a desire to remain in their familiar sur-
roundings and receive care from those they love. It is important,
however, to realize that 24-hour care of an elderly loved one can be
an onerous responsibility. The potential for abuse and neglect is
great. Elderly family members rarely will admit that this is happen-
ing, because of their dependency and the natural bond linking the
parent and child.'
The question of whether the ultimate decision is the "correct" one is
not my primary concern. The issue that most concerns me is that in these
situations-the pre-guardianship cases-there is no person who clearly
speaks for the impaired person. The caregiver in these cases often has
control over the financial affairs of the family, either because assets are in
joint bank accounts or because assets have been placed in the sole name of
the "healthy" spouse. Thus, guardianship is neither necessary nor sought.
The caregiver has the power to make the placement.
In the hospital setting, the discharge planner is not charged with the
duty of advocating the wishes of the patient but only with establishing an
appropriate and medically sound care plan. In fact, the hospital discharge
planner may be in a position where he or she has a conflict of interest, the
needs and economic interest of the institution being weighed against the
needs and wishes of the patient, with the result that the discharge plan-
ner-perhaps the only possible advocate of the wishes of the patient-may
be prevented by institutional pressures from taking action on the patient's
behalf.
In the home setting the problem is even more serious. When the
caregiver spouse makes the difficult decision for placement and has control
of the family's assets, the decision is usually implemented without outside
objection or interference. Unless the impaired patient is vocal, or difficult
enough to cause the nursing home or its other residents harm, a facility
will not decline an admission only because the rights and wishes of the
2 Patricia A. Young, Home-Care Characteristics That Shape the Exercise of Autonomy, GENER-
ArIoNs, Supp. 1990, at 17, 18, 19.
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patient may have been violated.
In his introductory article to the June, 1988 issue of The Gerontologist,
Brian F. Hofland wrote that "the due-process and equal-protection rights
of frail and impaired older adults are often abridged in the policies and
admission agreements of nursing homes and compromised in discharge-
planning and guardianship procedures." 3 Nevertheless, most of the atten-
tion to the issue of autonomy, i.e., control of decision-making by the indi-
vidual, focuses on the conflict between autonomy and paternalism because
of the tendency to define the best interests of the patient in accordance
with the values, goals, and experience of those seeking to furnish assis-
tance to the impaired older adult.
As Bart J. Collopy wrote,
When an elderly person makes decisions or acts in ways that seem
harmful, caregivers face what may be conflicting commitments: to
respect the person's autonomy, on the one hand, and to promote the
person's well-being, on the other. The choice between autonomy and
well-being, between freedom and best interest, is nettled with di-
lemma, since it requires not simply choosing right from wrong, but
choosing right from right, choosing one value over another. The
risks entailed in such choice raise what are perhaps the most ele-
mental questions in the ethics of long term care.4
The focus on the issue of autonomy versus paternalism is appropriate
where the best interest of the patient is the primary concern of all parties.
The direction of the law is clearly to give preference and weight to the
expressed wishes of the patient over the often rational desire and attempts
by the caregiver to intervene. Systems can, and are, being developed to
insure that the patient's wishes are protected, and when it is only the
interests of the patient that are involved, this approach is morally, ethi-
cally, and legally sound.
This value system breaks down when interests other than those of the
patient exist, such as an interest of the hospital in discharging a patient
because its third party payments expire, or in the case of a patient at
Brian F. Hofland, Autonomy in Long-Term-Care: Background Issues and a Programmatic
Response, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 3, 4 (June Supp. 1988).
4 Bart J. Collopy, Ethical Dimensions of Autonomy in Long-Term-Care, GENERATIONS, Supp.
1990, at 9, 9.
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home when the interests and needs of the caregiver conflict with the
wishes and (in some cases) the best interests of the patient.
In a perceptive article, Nancy N. Dubler discusses the doctrine of in-
formed consent and patient autonomy.5 She notes, in comparing institu-
tional decision-making standards with those to be applied in the home
care setting, that
In home care, by contrast, many individuals other than the patient/
client possess moral interests that demand respect, and autonomy of
the patient/client is but one factor among many real moral claims.
All of these parties, and their various interests, must be accounted
for in fashioning an ethically acceptable and practically feasible
home-care plan. This is especially true as home-care plans often en-
compass many social services as well as medical elements and, in
fact, may be relatively nonmedical in scope. In this process the con-
cept of "accommodation," rather than the solitary principle of au-
tonomy, should determine an ethically appropriate arrangement.
Because persons other than the patient have a weighty, focused, and
direct stake in home care, there can be no solitary decision making
based solely on autonomy; considerations of autonomy, unmodified
by consideration of the needs and plans of others, can result in a
selfish rather than a defensible choice.8
Patient autonomy must be balanced against several other factors,
Dubler states, including "the competing interests and obligations of fam-
ily, neighbors, and community whose functioning and whose lives may be
altered by the presence of the client in the home."'7 I agree with Dubler's
conclusion: "Because of the real moral claims of the various parties, in the
context of home care it makes far more sense to talk about accommodation
rather than autonomy. Accommodation requires mediating between the
patient's desires and (1) the reality of available services and (2) the real
and weighty competing interests of others."8
The cases of Charles and Mary are typical of the thousands of cases
Nancy N. Dubler, Autonomy and Accommodation: Mediating Individual Choice in the Home
Setting, GENERATIONS, Supp. 1990, at 29, 29.
8 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 31.
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involving an impaired senior citizen (frequently, these cases involve
younger, disabled people living at home) where the trauma of the illness
has turned a loving, caring situation into a horror of medical and eco-
nomic problems causing anger, frustration, and suffering on the part of
the caregiver who can, understandably, no longer give priority to the
needs and wishes of the patient.
The problem. with an accommodation approach is the concept that these
now conflicting interests should be mediated. The concept is flawed be-
cause, except in rare cases, the impaired patient has no voice and no rep-
resentative. The answer to the question, "Who speaks for Charles?" is
that, too often, no one does.
The issue is complicated because it is often unclear who the profes-
sional involved in the case represents. In a 1986 article, Dubler and I
asked, "Who is the client?"
When the relative of a disabled elderly patient seeks legal advice on
behalf of the patient, the ethical question shifts from competence to
who is the client? If the lawyer concludes that the patient's incapac-
ity forces a family member to make decisions, a number of questions
arise.
1. What is the attorney's obligation to assure adequate
legal representation for the disabled elderly patient?
2. Does the obligation to ensure legal representation ex-
ist only when the needs of patient and family clearly
conflict?
3. Is it appropriate to transfer the patient's assets to a
family member to create future Medicaid eligibility for
the patient? Suppose the transfers would limit certain fu-
ture care options for the patient, but would clearly protect
the family from future poverty? Who should decide if
there is a conflict, and who should resolve it?
4. In evaluating who is the client, should the lawyer's
decision be affected by the patient's medical condition,
such a's the existence of fluctuating paranoid ideation
symptoms or other transitory mental impairment?9
9 Peter J. Strauss & Nancy N. Dubler, Ethical Issues in Decision Making, CoMPLEAT LAW.,
Fall 1986, at 14, 14.
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These questions should be asked by all professionals who work in home
care crisis situations. Physicians, social workers, visiting nurses, or com-
munity leaders who counsel the patient and the caregiver face the di-
lemma of determining who they represent. The National Association of
Private Geriatric Care Managers (NAPGCM) addressed .this problem
when it adopted a code of standards and practices. Standard 1 is on point:
While the "primary client" usually is the older person whose care
needs have instigated the referral to a private geriatric care man-
ager, all others affected by her/his care needs should be considered
part of the "client system."
Rationale
In the area of private geriatric care management, the care needs
of the older person often have significant consequences for others.
The private geriatric care manager's goal is to assist the individual
members of the client system to understand fully the issues under
consideration and arrive at a solution which allows maximum deci-
sion making autonomy for the person receiving care and for the
other persons involved with or affected by these care needs.
Guidelines
1) The "primary client" may not be the person who
makes the initial contact or the person responsible for
payment for services rendered.
2) Members of the "client system" may include:
- the older person
- a family member within or outside of the
older person's household
- a paid caregiver
- friends, neighbors or community agencies
- a third party with fiduciary responsibilities
- other professionals, such as a physician, a
nurse from a home health care agency, an attor-
ney etc.
- the private geriatric care manager . . .
3) In the event of conflicting needs within the client sys-
tem, the goal of professional intervention should be to
strive for resolution through a process of review and dis-
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cussion among the parties, facilitated by the private geri-
,atric care manager.
4) The private geriatric care manager should request
assistance of appropriate peers, as needed, to help the cli-
ent system find an acceptable solution to the conflict it
faces.10
Working with private care managers throughout the country, it has
been my experience that this standard does, in fact, govern their practice.
The presence of a professional whose intervention is guided by the ap-
proach called for by the NAPGCM standard constitutes the kind of medi-
ation system advocated by Dubler. Allegiance to this type of approach
significantly minimizes possible abuses. When alternatives are explored,
public and private resources identified, counseling and respite care made
available to the caregiver, and adequate in-home care services instituted,
continued treatment at home may be possible and institutionalization can
be deferred or possibly made unnecessary. I believe it is critical to find
ways to make these services available to all families where home care is
becoming difficult. Programs of counseling and intervention could be
based in a variety of institutions: Area Agencies on Aging, local not-for-
profit organizations, corporate employee assistance programs, or commu-
nity advocacy groups. Funding is obviously the key to broadening the
availability of such programs; I propose that Medicare and Medicaid reg-
ulations be amended to provide coverage for such services. Further, I pro-
pose that federal and state regulations regarding Medicare Supplemental
Insurance and long term care insurance policies be amended to require
reasonable coverage for social workers, care managers, and not-for-profit
organizations who offer programs of counseling and intervention.
The nursing home and home health care industries should play a
greater role in dealing with these problems. Nursing homes and home
health care agencies have been a major beneficiary of Medicare and
Medicaid and ought to take on a greater financial role in supporting
counseling and mediation programs.
Attorneys and physicians need to become better educated about the crit-
10 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE GERIATRIC CARE MANAGERS, STANDARDS AND
PRACTICES Standard 1 (1990).
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ical role they play in working with the patient and caregiver. The profes-
sional can be the key to the caregiver's acceptance of appropriate
intervention.
It has been suggested that advance directives can serve to protect the
rights of the patient when unwanted placement decisions are proposed. I
do not see the advance directive as an effective tool to protect the patient's
choice in placement decision-making since in most cases the holder of the
patient's proxy will be the spouse, the person who has the greatest conflict
of interest at the time placement is proposed.
In the final analysis, placement decisions often are made because there
are no funds to provide adequate in-home services and insufficient alter-
natives to nursing home placement. Many nursing home residents can be
cared for at home or in other kinds of non-institutional settings. We need
to develop new forms of alternative living facilities as well as new re-
sources to support caregivers. Until this happens, understandable but
often unnecessary nursing home placements will occur and the wishes and
rights of patients will continue to be neglected.
I began this Article by stressing my belief in the adversarial system as
the best way to protect autonomy and patient choice. Applied to decision-
making in the home care setting, a pure adversarial system will not work.
Something in between that and the current total absence of protection of
the patient's rights must be developed. A meaningful counseling and me-
diation system can work, but, except for a few cases where funds and
programs are in place, the necessary system does not exist.
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